Working Paper
Working Paper
Robust Network Targeting with Multiple Nash Equilibria
SETA Young Scholar Award
Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementary, we develop an optimal treatment allocation mechanism that is robust to the presence of multiple equilibria.
Individualized Treatment Allocation in Sequential Network Games, with Toru Kitagawa. (2026)
Quantitative Economics, conditionally accepted.
Focusing on sequential decision games of interacting agents, this paper develops a method to obtain optimal treatment assignment rules that maximize a social welfare criterion by evaluating stationary distributions of outcomes.
Who Should Get Vaccinated? Individualized Allocation of Vaccines Over SIR Network, with Toru Kitagawa, (2023).
Journal of Econometrics, 232, 109–131. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2021.09.009. This paper is linked to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
We develop a procedure to estimate individualized vaccine allocation policy under capacity constraint, exploiting social network data in which we observe individual demographic characteristics and health status.